How to fake auxiliary input
LNCS
Jetchev, Dimitar
Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
Lindell, Yehuda
ddc:004
Consider a joint distribution (X,A) on a set. We show that for any family of distinguishers, there exists a simulator such that 1 no function in can distinguish (X,A) from (X,h(X)) with advantage ε, 2 h is only O(2 3ℓ ε -2) times less efficient than the functions in. For the most interesting settings of the parameters (in particular, the cryptographic case where X has superlogarithmic min-entropy, ε > 0 is negligible and consists of circuits of polynomial size), we can make the simulator h deterministic. As an illustrative application of our theorem, we give a new security proof for the leakage-resilient stream-cipher from Eurocrypt'09. Our proof is simpler and quantitatively much better than the original proof using the dense model theorem, giving meaningful security guarantees if instantiated with a standard blockcipher like AES. Subsequent to this work, Chung, Lui and Pass gave an interactive variant of our main theorem, and used it to investigate weak notions of Zero-Knowledge. Vadhan and Zheng give a more constructive version of our theorem using their new uniform min-max theorem.
Springer
2014
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
doc-type:conferenceObject
text
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
https://research-explorer.app.ist.ac.at/record/2236
https://research-explorer.app.ist.ac.at/download/2236/5275
Jetchev D, Pietrzak KZ. How to fake auxiliary input. In: Lindell Y, ed. Vol 8349. Springer; 2014:566-590. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24">10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24</a>
eng
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/isbn/978-364254241-1
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/259668
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess